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WORKERS' COMPENSATION: Exclusivity, Common
Law Remedies, and the Reconsideration of the
Actual Intent Test-Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc.
MARIPOSA PADILLA SIVAGE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc.,' the New Mexico Supreme Court
overruled the use of the "actual intent test"' as the sole test to deterrdne when an
employee may overcome the Workers' Compensation Act3 exclusivity provisions
and use common law remedies against an employer for injuries sustained as a result
of non-accidental employer behavior. The court held that employees may use
common law tort remedies when "an employer willfully or intentionally injures a
worker." 4 In adopting "willfulness" as behavior sufficient to overcome the Act's
exclusivity provision, the court expanded an employee's ability to recover in tort by
lowering the level of employer misconduct required to escape exclusivity, while
preserving the intent of the Act by subjecting both employers and employees to the
same standard of conduct and the equivalent consequences for misconduct.5 This
Note discusses the historical context of the New Mexico workers' compensation
system, examines the Delgado court's rationale, provides a critical analysis of the
court's reasoning, and explores the implications of the Delgado decision on the
future of workers' compensation litigation in New Mexico.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After the death of her husband, plaintiff Michelle Delgado, as personal
representative, individually, and as the mother of Danielle and Gabrielle Delgado,
sued Phelps Dodge Chino (Chino), her husband's employer, and two of its
employees.6
Mr. Delgado worked at the Phelps Dodge smelting plant in Hurley, New Mexico,
for two years. The smelting plant distills copper ore from unusable rock, called
"slag," by superheating the unprocessed rock to a temperature in excess of 2,000
degrees Fahrenheit. The ore rises to the top, where it is collected, wile the slag
moves to the bottom of the furnace, where it drains though a valve called a "skim
hole." The slag then passes down a chute into a fifteen-foot-tall cauldron called a
* Class of 2003, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Ted
Occhialino, for his patience and guidance on this Note. I also would like to thank my wonderful husband for his
patience, understanding, and love, and my family for their continued love and support.
1. 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148.
2. The court expressly overruled the following cases in which the "actual intent" test had been adopted and
followed as law in New Mexico: Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 120 N.M. 645, 905 P.2d 185 (1995); Flores v.
Danfelser, 127 N.M. 571,985 P.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1999); Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. v. Barnes, 115 N.M.
116, 847 P.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1993); Maestas v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 110 N.M. 609, 798 P.2d 210 (Ct. App.
1990); Gallegos v. Chastain, 95 N.M. 551, 624 P.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1981); Sanford v. Presto Mfg. Co., 92 N.M. 746,
594 P.2d 1202 (Ct. App. 1979).
3. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-1 to-70 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-1 (1991
Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
4. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 1 1, 131 N.M. at
, 34 P.3d at 1149 (emphasis added).
5. See id.
6. Unless otherwise cited, all factual and procedural information is from Delgado, 2001-NMqSC-034
I11, 131 N.M. at _, 34 P.3d at 1150-52.
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"ladle," which is in a tunnel below the furnace. Usually, when the ladle reaches
three-quarters of its thirty-five-ton capacity, workers use a "mudgun" to fill the skim
hole with clay, stopping the flow of the molten slag. An employee in a specially
designed truck, called a "kress haul," then enters the tunnel to lift and remove the
ladle.
On June 30, 1998, Mr. Delgado's crew was working under the supervision of
Mike Burkett and Charlie White and was being pressured to work harder to
compensate for the loss of production and revenue incurred after a recent ten-day
shutdown. Suddenly, the crew experienced a dangerous emergency situation known
as a "runaway." The ladle had reached three-quarters of its capacity, but the flowing
slag could not be stopped because the mudgun was inoperable and manual efforts
to close the skim hole had failed. To make matters worse, the consistency of the slag
caused it to flow at an extraordinarily fast rate, resulting in the worst runaway
situation many of the workers had ever seen.
Chino could have shut down the furnace, allowing for safe removal of the ladle.
Instead, because of the prior ten-day shutdown and to avoid another shutdown and
economic loss, Chino ordered Delgado to enter the tunnel on the kress haul and
remove the ladle while the molten slag was flowing over the brim. Delgado had
never operated a kress haul under emergency conditions, and as he entered the
tunnel and saw the molten slag overflowing, he radioed White and told him that he
was neither qualified nor able to perform the removal and requested assistance.
White insisted he proceed and denied his request for assistance.
Delgado entered the tunnel. He emerged from the smoke-filled tunnel engulfed
in flames. Delgado asked co-workers, "Why did they send me in there?.. .Itold them
I couldn't do it. They made me do it anyway. Charlie sent me in."7 Delgado suffered
third-degree burns and died three weeks later.
The plaintiff brought claims of wrongful death, loss of consortium, prima facie
tort, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against defendants Phelps Dodge
Chino, White, and Burkett. The plaintiff argued that Chino acted intentionally with
knowledge that Delgado would be seriously injured or killed as a result of their
actions. Chino moved to dismiss,8 arguing it was immune from suit by virtue of the
exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.9
The trial court granted Chino' s motion to dismiss, stating that the "plaintiff only
established that the defendant did engage in a series of deliberate or intentional acts
that it knew or should have known would almost certainly result in injury or death
to Delgado, but the complaint falls short of alleging they actually intended to harm
him."' ° The plaintiff appealed the trial court's ruling. The New Mexico Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, citing Johnson Controls World Services,
Inc. v. Barnes" and Professor Arthur Larson's treatise 2 holding that "[tihe Act

,34P.3dat 1151.
7. Id. 5, 131 N.M. at
8. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-012(B)(6).
9. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-9 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
10. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-0341 7, 131 N.M. at __, 34P.3dat 1151.
1I.See Delgado v. Phelps Dodge, No. 20,972, slip op. at 5 (N.M. Ct. App. May 3, 2000) (citing Johnson
Controls World Services, Inc. v. Barnes, 115 N.M. 116, 119, 847 P.2d 761, 764 (Ct. App. 1993)).
12. See id. (citing ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, 6 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW §
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provides an employer immunity from tort liability unless the worker's injury stems
from the employer's 'actual intent' to injure the worker."' 13 The court of appeals
agreed with the trial court's determination
that plaintiff failed to allege facts
14
sufficient to establish actual intent.
After certiorari was granted, the plaintiff requested that the Supreme Court adopt
a test in which the bar of exclusivity would be lifted when the employer knows that
its conduct is substantially certain to result in the worker's injury or death, even if
the employer did not actually intend harm to the worker. In reversing both the trial
court and the court of appeals, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the actual
intent test unfairly favors employers and rejected it as the sole test to raise the bar
of exclusivity.Ihe court did not adopt the plaintiff's proposed substantial certainty
test, but established a new test and held that employees are permitted to use common
law tort remedies when "an employer willfully or intentionally injures a worker."' 6
II. BACKGROUND
The Workers' Compensation Act, adopted by the New Mexico Legislature in
1917, 17 provides employers with immunity from common law suits brought by
employees accidentally injured in the scope and course of their employment.
Although the Act has undergone periodic revisions,18 the exclusivity provisions
remain the cornerstone of the Act. The basis of recovery under the Act is that the
injury sustained must be accidental.' 9 As long as the injury sustained is accidental
and the other recovery requirements of the Act are satisfied,2" both the employer and
employee are governed exclusively by the Act.2 ' The Act does not define "accident"
or what constitutes non-accidental injury for which the employee can escape the
exclusivity provision and sue in a common law cause of action. However, the Act
provides that an employee's injury will be non-compensable under the Act if it is
due to intoxication or is willfully or intentionally self-inflicted.22 These provisions
are possible indications of what non-accidental behavior is for both the employee
and employer.

103.03 (2000)).
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. See Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034 23, 131 N.M. 272, _ 34 P.3d 1148,
1155.
16. Id. 18, 131N.M.at-,34P.3dat1151.
17. New Mexico Laws 1917, Ch. 83, codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-1 to -70 (1991 Repl. Pamp. &
Supp. 2001).
18. The Act was amended in part in 1986, 1987, and 1990. The amended sections primarily focused on the
distinction between partial disability and total disability and other related matters. The Act's exclusivity provisions
have not been amended recently. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-9 was last amended in 1973, and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 521-11 was last amended in 1989. See also Eldridge v. Circle K Corp., 123 N.M. 145, 148, 934 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Ct.
App. 1997).
19. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-6, -8, -9 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
20. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-9 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001) (requiring that the injury be accidental,
that the employer have complied with the act, that the employee be performing service arising out of and in the
course of his employment, and that the injury be proximately caused by the accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment and not be intentionally self-inflicted).
21. Id.; see also Gonzales v. Chino Copper Co., 29 N.M. 228, 222 P. 903 (1924).
22. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-11(1991 Repi. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
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The judiciary must review the statute and determine the underlying intent and
purpose of the legislature23 and, therefore, determine when exceptions to the
exclusivity provisions exist. Currently, three exceptions to the Act's exclusivity
provisions exist.24 In carving out these exceptions, the focus of the New Mexico
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals has been to define accidental or non-accidental
conduct. In doing so, the courts have used the ordinary meaning of accident25 and
held that, for the bar of exclusivity to be lifted, the injury sustained must be nonaccidental and, therefore, intentional.26 The courts thus had to define "intentional"
for purposes of the exclusivity provision, which neither defines the term nor
specifically uses the term. In a line of cases beginning in 1979, the courts defined
"intentional," or non-accidental, for purposes of the Act as the "actual intent" of the
employer to injure the employee. 27 The requirements of the actual intent test proved
to be difficult for an injured employee to establish. In practice, it granted employers
blanket immunity from suit even if they knew that an injury would result, so long
as they hoped it would not.
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Delgado revisited the issue of what
constitutes an accidental injury. The court determined that the intended uniformity
of the Act required that both employers and employees be held to the same standard
of conduct when determining the application of the Act's exclusivity provisions.28
Therefore, the court held that the state of mind sufficient to deny an employee
benefits under the Act 29 should be applied to the employer's conduct when
determining if an injury was non-accidental and thereby outside the coverage of the
Act's exclusivity provisions.30
A. The Policy Underlying the Workers' CompensationAct
The New Mexico Workers' Compensation system reflects a legislative balancing
between employers and employees. The Act "is based on a mutual renunciation of
common law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike."'" The
employee gives up the right to sue the employer under the common law in exchange

23. Baca v. Complete Drywall Co., 2002-NMCA-002lq 12, 13, _
N.M...,
38 P.2d 181, 184.
24. Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 N.M. 47, 52, 976 P.2d 999, 1004 (1999). ("A claim falls outside
the WCA for work-related injuries if: 1) the injuries do not arise out of employment, 2) substantial evidence exists
that the employer intended to injure the worker, and 3) the injuries are not those compensable under the act.")
(internal citations omitted). This Note focuses only on the second exception to the Act's exclusivity provisions.
25. See Cisneros v. Molycorp, Inc., 107 N.M. 788, 791, 765 P.2d 761, 764 (Ct. App. 1988) (defining
accident as "an unlooked-for mishap or some untoward event that is not expected or designed"); see also Aranbula
v. Banner Mining Co., 49 N.M. 253, 258, 161 P.2d 867, 870 (1945).
26. See generally Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 120 N.M. 645, 905 P.2d 185 (1995); Flores v. Danfelser,
1999-NMCA-091 127 N.M. 571, 985 P.2d 173; Johnson Controls World Services v. Barnes, 115 N.M. 116, 847
P.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1993); Maestas v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 110 N.M. 609, 798 P.2d 210 (Ct. App. 1990);
Gallegos v. Chastain, 95 N.M. 551, 624 P.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1981); Sanford v. Presto Mfg. Co., 92 N.M. 746, 594
P.2d 1202 (Ct. App. 1979).
27. Coleman, 120 N.M. at 652-53, 905 P.2d at 192-93; Flores, 127 N.M. at 573-76, 985 P.2d at 177-78;
Johnson Controls, 115 N.M.at 119, 847 P.2d at 764; Maestas, 110 N.M. at 611,798 P.2d at 212; Gallegos, 95 N.M.
at 553, 624 P.2d at 62; Sanford, 92 N.M. at 748, 594 P.2d at 1204.
28. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 123, 131 N.M. at __,34 P.3d at 1155.
29. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-11 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
30. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 14, 131 N.M. at __, 34 P.3d at 1152.
31. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-1 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
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for quick compensation without enduring the rigors of litigation and proving fault.32
The Act assures the employer that an employee injured, even by the employer's own
negligence, is limited to compensation under the Act.33

The legislature adopted the Act to "substitute a more humanitarian and
economical system of compensation for injured workmen or their dependants in case
of their death."34 In addition, the Act was designed to substitute a more uniform
scale of compensation in cases of accidental injury and to provide recovery for an
injured employee without the time, expense, and difficulty of proving negligence.35
Furthermore, the policy premiums paid by the employer to insure compensation for
an accidentally injured employee are absorbed by the consumer in the cost of the
products and services and are viewed as part of the cost of doing business.36
The Act, as demonstrated in Section 52-5-1, 3' also seeks to ensure the uniform
and equal application of its provisions to both employers and employees. Until
Delgado, the courts had not thoroughly analyzed the equality principle underlying
the Act and had based their decisions strictly on the "accident" requirement and
exclusivity provisions of the Act.38
The policies and protections granted to both employers and employees underlying
the Act are compromised by the actual intent test. The Act provides expedient
compensation to employees accidentally injured in the scope of their employment.
Still, application of the exclusivity provisions as a bar to common law action by an
employee in the case of non-accidental injury has produced much controversy and
litigation. The legislature created the Act to provide compensation for injured
employees without subjecting them to the rigors of common law actions and
employer's affirmative defenses.39 Over time, however, the Act's exclusivity
provisions, construed to deny an employee common law relief unless the employer
actually intended to cause the injury, placed employees in the situation the
legislature sought to prohibit in adopting the compensation system. As a result, in
practice, the actual intent test limited an intentionally injured employee to the
recovery under the Act. Thus, when an employee sustains a non-accidental injury
to which the actual intent test applies, the protections granted by and the policies
underlying the compensation system are compromised.

32. Gonzales v. Chino Copper Co,29 N.M. 228, 229, 222 P. 903, 904 (1924).
33. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-9 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
34. Gonzales, 29 N.M. at 232, 222 P. at 904-05.

35. Id. at 232, 222 P. at 905.
36. Id. at 233, 222 P. at 905.
37. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-1 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
38. See generally Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 120 N.M. 645, 905 P.2d 185 (1995); Flores v. Danfelser.
1999-NMCA-091 127 N.M. 571, 985 P.2d 173; Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. v. Barnes, 115 N.M.
116,
847 P.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1993); Maestas v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., I10 N.M. 609, 798 P.2d 210 (Ct. App.
1990);
Gallegos v. Chastain, 95 N.M. 551, 624 P.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1981); Sanford v. Presto Mfg. Co., 92 N.M. 746,
594
P.2d 1202 (Ct. App. 1979).

39. See Gonzales, 29 N.M. at232, 222 P. at 904-05 (1924).
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B. The Origins of the Actual Intent Test
The New Mexico Court of Appeals introduced the actual intent test in Sanford
v. Presto Mfg. Co.40 In Sanford, the plaintiff sued her employer, outside the Act, for
damages sustained in an alleged battery. 4' The defendant had installed a new oven
for coating small appliances with Teflon. 42 The plaintiff alleged that the use of the
oven created toxic fumes, that she was exposed to the fumes while working, and that
the defendant knew of the fumes and did nothing to remedy the situation. 43 The
defendant moved to dismiss on the basis that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was
under the Act. The complaint alleged that the defendant intentionally permitted a
dangerous work condition to exist and that the defendant intentionally tolerated a
dangerous condition."
The court recognized that the plaintiff could recover in tort if she suffered an
intentional injury at the hands of her employer.4' Relying on other jurisdictions and
Professor Larson's treatise on workers' compensation law,' the court ruled that the
plaintiff must prove an actual intent to injure by her employer to raise the bar of
exclusivity provided by the Act.47 The court stated that the requisite intent to be
alleged and proved is a "deliberate infliction of harm."' The court held that the facts
as alleged in the complaint were insufficient to prove actual intent because the
injuries suffered by the plaintiff, as a result of the working conditions, were
accidental within the meaning of the Act.4 9
The court of appeals next addressed the issue of actual intent in Gallegos v.
Chastain.50 In Gallegos, the plaintiff alleged he was injured when a fellow employee
committed a battery upon him while the two were working together.5 ' The plaintiff
argued that the alleged battery resulted from the failure of the defendant to take
reasonable precautions to prevent physical harm from supervisory personnel and that
the defendant intended to injure him. 2 The court relied on the rule articulated in
Sanford, stating, "the basis for the employer's liability outside the act is an actual
intent to injure. 5 3 The court held that, for the plaintiff s claims to succeed, he must
have a factual basis that supports the employer's actual intent to injure him. 4 In
Gallegos, the plaintiff only alleged that an intentional tort had occurred, without

40. 92 N.M. 746, 594 P.2d 1202 (Ct. App. 1979).
41. Id. at 747, 594 P.2d at 1203.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 748, 594 P.2d at 1204.
45. Id.
46. See LARSON, supra note 12, § 103.03, at 103-7 ("[Tlhe common law liability of the employer.. .cannot
be stretched to include accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton, wilful, deliberate, intentional, reckless,
culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of statute or other misconduct of the employer short of conscious and
deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting an injury.")
47. Sanford, 92 N.M. at 748, 594 P.2d at 1204.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 95 N.M. 551, 624 P.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1981).
51. Id. at 552, 624 P.2d at 61.
52. Id. at 554, 624 P.2d at 63.
53. Id. at 553, 624 P.2d at 62.
54. Id. at 554, 624 P.2d at 63.
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pleading facts specific to prove actual intent to harm. The court found such pleading
to be insufficient. 55
Ten years after Gallegos, the court of appeals again addressed the issue of an
employer's actual intent to injure in Maestas v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.56 In
Maestas, a welder sued his employer for personal injures resulting from an on-thejob explosion that occurred after the employer allegedly directed him to place a
highly explosive mixture in a pipe that plaintiff was welding." In his complaint, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant intentionally, willfully, and wantonly caused his
injuries by directing him to place the mixture in the pipe.58
In Maestas, the plaintiff relied on Sanford and argued that his injures fell within
the rule that common law claims are limited to "injuries deliberately inflicted [by
the employer]., 59 The court agreed that the test is actual intent but found the
plaintiff's injuries were accidental and, therefore, covered by the Act.' The court
further found that the matters pleaded in the complaint did not support a claim for
intentional tort.6' In Maestas, the complaint stated that the "employer knew" the
work situation was dangerous. The court did not accept the plaintiff's argument and
found that knowledge by the employer that inherently dangerous working conditions
exist is insufficient to allow the injured employee to pursue a claim against his
employer outside the Act, because it does not satisfy the actual intent to injure test.62
In 1993, the court of appeals firmly endorsed the use of the actual intent test as
the sole test to determine when the Act's bar of exclusivity would be lifted. In
Johnson Controls World Services v. Barnes,6 3 the court held that, for an employee
to impose tort liability on his employer, he must "plead and prove an actual intent
to injure the employee on the part of the employer."'
The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a heavy equipment operator. He
was injured when the defendant directed him to operate a trackhoe machine and
remove several underground storage tanks that previously stored petroleum and
other hazardous substances for Los Alamos National Laboratory.65 The plaintiff was
injured when he was splashed with toxic liquid that remained in one of the tanks he
was ordered to remove. 66 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant intentionally
engaged in unsafe work practices by failing to provide him with appropriate
protective clothing and eyewear, falsely informing him that the tanks were
completely drained, and ordering him to perform the work even though the
67
employer was aware that physical injury was "substantially certain to result.,

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
110 N.M. 609, 798 P.2d 210 (Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 610, 798 P.2d at 211.
Id. at 610-11,798 P.2d at 211-12.
Id. at 611, 798 P.2d at 212.
Id.
Id. at 612, 798 P.2d at 213.
Id.
115 N.M. 116, 847 P.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 122, 847 P.2d at 767.
Id. at 117, 847 P.2d at 762.
Id.
Id.

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 32

The defendant argued that the actual intent test was established law in New
Mexico and in line with the policy supporting the Act's preference for exclusivity."
The court rejected the proposal to expand actual intent to include conduct that was
"substantially certain" to result in injury and reaffirmed the use of the actual intent
test as the sole test to raise the bar of exclusivity. 69
In affirming the use of the actual intent test, the court discussed at length the
previously discussed cases, reaffirming that the law in this area is well established.7"
In support of the actual intent test, the court relied on the Act's requirement of an
accident and sought to distinguish accidents from non-accidents.7 The court relied
on the words "accidentally sustained" as found within the Act72 and defined the
phrase as "injury or death arising from an unintended or unexpected event. '73 In
doing so, the court created a standard in which an accident is anything less than the
actual intent of the employer to injure the employee. Thus, "[a]n injury may
unintentionally result even though an employer set 74the stage for the injury by
deceiving or misrepresenting the facts to the worker.,
The court stated, "The majority of jurisdictions that have considered this question
appear to agree that a mere showing of misrepresentation or deceit is insufficient to
defeat the exclusivity provisions. 75 In support of the actual intent test, the court
created a two-part test to determine when the bar of exclusivity will be raised.76 The
court must first ask, "Did the employer intend to commit the alleged act?" 77 Second,
the court must inquire whether "the circumstances support a reasonable inference
that the employer directly intended to harm the worker. ' 7' The second inquiry
involves an examination of the true intent of the employer.79
In applying the test, the court accepted the plaintiff s allegation that the defendant
falsely informed him of the condition of the pipes on the day of the injury and that
he was ordered to take the pipes out before they were disconnected, 0 thereby
satisfying the first prong of the test. To determine whether the second prong had
been met, the court looked to the plaintiff's description of the incident to see if it
was an "accident" or if the incident was the "deliberate consequence[] of [the
defendant's] behavior."'" Based on the plaintiffs description of the incident the
court found it unreasonable to believe that the defendant actually intended the injury
to occur.8 2 In addition, the court found that, even if the defendant's conduct

68. Id. at 118, 847 P.2d at 762.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 118-19, 847 P.2d at 762-63.
71. Id. at 118,847 P.2d at 762.
72. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-9 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
73. Johnson Controls, 115 N.M. at 121, 847 P.2d at 766 (citing Aranbula v. Banner Min. Co., 49 N.M. 253,
161 P.2d 867 (1945); and Bufalino v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 N.M. 560, 650 P.2d 844 (Ct. App. 1982)).
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing LARSON, supra note 12, § 103.03, at 103-7).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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amounted to fraudulent misrepresentation, the facts did not prove the defendant's
conduct was "equivalent to a left jab to the chin."83
The court stated, "Absent an allegation in the complaint asserting that the injury
sustained by Plaintiff was intentionally inflicted [by the defendant]... the language
of Section 52-1-9.. .is determinative of this issue."' The court reversed
and
remanded the action to the district court, requiring that the cause of action
be
dismissed.85 The court of appeals affirmed the requirement of fact-specific pleading,
calling for the plaintiff to plead and prove the employer's actual intent to injure
the
employee.86 As a result of the decision in Johnson Controls, employers covered
by
the Act were shielded from liability unless the employee could sufficiently plead
and
prove his injury was the intended consequence of the employer's acts or omissions.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, guided by the New Mexico Supreme Court's
initial declaration of the Act as the exclusive remedy for work-related accidents
in
Gonzales,87 has been the main source of interpretation of the Act' s exclusivity
provisions. The New Mexico Supreme Court has given much deference to the
court
of appeals' decisions adopting the actual intent test. The supreme court
has
occasionally addressed exclusivity, however, and the intent required for
an
employee to sue his or her employer in tort.88 Especially important to the understanding of its decision in Delgado is Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 9
In Coates, the supreme court slightly modified the actual intent test. There, the
plaintiffs brought claims of negligent supervision and intentional infliction
of
83. Id. (citing Sanford v. Presto Mfg. Co., 92 N.M. 746, 748, 594 P.2d 1202,
1204 (Ct. App. 1979); and
LARSON, supra note 12, § 103.03, at 103-9).
84. Johnson Controls, 115 N.M. at 121, 847 P.2d at 765.
85. Id. at 122, 847 P.2d at 767.
86. Id.
87. See Gonzales v. Chino Copper Co., 29 N.M. 228, 222 P. 903 (1924).
88. Coleman v. Eddy Potash Inc., 120 N.M. 645, 905 P.2d 185 (1995). In Coleman,
which was decided two
years after Johnson Controls, the plaintiff was injured when a vertical conveyor
belt manlifi: she was riding
malfunctioned and she fell sixty feet to the ground. Id. at 647, 905 P.2d at 187.
The plaintiff sought recovery under
the Act for the personal injuries she suffered, but brought suit against her employer
for intentional and negligent
spoliation of evidence based on the employer's alleged disassembly, replacement,
and loss of parts from the
machine that caused her injuries. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the disassembly
and loss of parts prejudiced her
ability to recover against other defendants on product liability claims, which is
expressly permitted by N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 52-1-6(E) (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001). Id. The court cited the
relevant exclusivity provisions of the
Act, concluding that "the compensation remedy provided in the Act is exclusive
of all other remedies against the
employer for the same injury." Id. at 652, 905 P.2d at 192. The court, again
relying on Larson, found that if an
injury is not included within the Act's coverage formula, the exclusivity provisions
do not apply. Id. Therefore, if
a claim cannot be equated with recovery for personal injuries, it does not fall within
the coverage of the Act. Id. In
Coleman, the claim of spoliation of evidence fell outside the coverage of the Act,
because ,he claim is not connected
to the accident that resulted in personal injury. Id. at 653, 905 P.2d at 193. The
court, in discussing the exceptions
to the Act's exclusivity provisions, approvingly cited both Larson and Johnson
Controls, and reiterated that an
exception to the exclusivity provisions exists for intentional injuries inflicted on
a worker by the employer and that
the test in such cases is whether the injury stems from an actual intent to injure
the worker. Id. The court held "that
a worker's claim against his employer for intentional spoliation of evidence is
not barred by the Act's exclusivity
provisions." Id. The court based its holding on its definition of the tort of intentional
spoliation of evidence, which
requires an actual intent on the defendant's part to harm the plaintiffs economic
interests. As a result of this
decision, a worker could bring a claim in tort for non-physical injuries sustained
as a result of, or in conjunction
with, an accidental work related injury without fear of the Act's exclusivity
provisions, so long as the injury,
physical or not, was non-accidental, and, therefore, intentional. See also Coates
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999NMSC-013, 127 N.M. 47, 976 P.2d 999.
89. 127 N.M. 47, 976 P.2d 999 (1999). Justice Franchini concurred in part and
dissented in part; however,
his dissenting opinion dealt with evidentiary issues and not the exclusivity issue
addressed by the majority.
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emotional distress against the defendant relating to alleged sexual harassment by
another employee. 9' The plaintiffs claimed that their supervisor sexually harassed
them over the course of a year, and that the defendant knew of the harassment and
failed to protect them.9 The defendant argued that the Act's exclusivity provision
barred the plaintiffs tort claims.92 In addition, the defendant argued that the Act
provides employees with the exclusive remedy for any personal injury sustained in
the workplace.9 3 The court disagreed with the defendant's position, stating that "the
exclusivity provision is not an absolute bar" and the Act covers only injuries that fall
within its coverage.94
The court relied on New Mexico case law, stating that there are three occasions
in which a claim for work-related injuries falls outside the Act.95 The first is when
injuries do not arise out of employment, the second is when the plaintiff has
substantial evidence to prove the employer intended to injure the employee, and the
third is when the injuries are non-compensable under the Act.96
The court found that all three exceptions existed in Coates.97 The court first held
that injuries caused by sexual harassment do not arise out of employment.98 The
court, relying on the policy underlying sexual harassment claims, found that,
"although the plaintiff s injury may have been causally related to her employment,
sexual harassment does not amount to an accident 'arising out of her employment'
under the [Act]."'
Second, the court found that sexual harassment is not an "accident" that invokes
the coverage of the Act."° Because sexual harassment cannot be viewed as an
'unintended or unexpected event and is a form of discrimination that is not
acceptable in society, employers must be responsible for maintaining a workplace
free from sexual harassment.10 1 As a result, the court held the Act's exclusivity
provisions do not apply to an employee seeking a remedy outside the Act for claims
of sexual harassment.0 2 In addition to sexual harassment not being an accident, the
supreme court found that the plaintiffs alleged and presented sufficient evidence to
show that the defendant acted intentionally.0 3 The court, however, deviated from
the actual intent or deliberate infliction of harm test laid out by the court of appeals

90. Id. at 50, 976 P.2d at 1002.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 52, 976 P.2d at 1004.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Cox, 115 N.M. at 337-38, 850 P.2d at 1040-41; Johnson Controls, 115 N.M. at 118, 847 P.2d
at 763; and Sebella, 121 N.M. at 599, 915 P.2d at 904).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 53, 976 P.2d at 1003 (citing Cox, 115 N.M. at 338, 850 P.2d at 1041).
100. Id.
101.

Id.

102. Id.
103. Id. at 53, 976 P.2d at 1004 (citing Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 120 N.M. 343, 901
P.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1995)). Beavers also relied on Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. v. Barnes, 115 N.M. 116,
118, 847 P.2d 761, 763 (Ct. App. 1993) (stating, "an employer must have actual intent to injure the employee.").
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in Johnson Controls and found that knowledge of the harassment and failure to
remedy the situation was sufficient to show intentional behavior."°4
Without overruling or expressly distinguishing precedent, the court implicitly
altered the actual intent test to include knowledge of the injury and failure to remedy
on the part of the employer, at least in cases where the injury does not arise out of
employment. The opinion, however, did not make clear the application of the
knowledge component in the context of cases in which a non-accidental workplace
injury occurs, as in Johnson Controls where the employer misrepresented the
situation to the employee and knew an injury was substantially certain to occur.
Several months later, without reference to the supreme court's decision in Coates,
the court of appeals again addressed the application of the actual intent test as a
barrier to recovery outside the bounds of the Act's exclusivity provisions. In Flores
v. Danfelser, °5 the plaintiff sued her employer for personal injuries sustained when
a third party attacked and stabbed her while she was at work in her office. °6 The
plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendant made a deliberate and intentional
policy decision to allow third parties access to employee office areas and that the
defendant knew of the dangers of allowing public access to the office areas.° 7 In this
case, the court once again applied the actual intent test to determine if the plaintiff's
claims were barred by the Act's exclusivity provisions. In Flores, the court
determined that the proper inquiry was not whether the defendant knew or should
have known that the plaintiff might be injured by a third party, but whether the
defendant had actual intent to injure her. "
0
The court, relying on its decision in Sanford,'" on Professor Larson's treatise,"
and on Johnson Controls,"' held that "the litmus test for determining whether a
worker's injury is controlled by the exclusivity rules is whether such injury stems
from an actual intent on the part of the employer, or his or her alter ego, to injure the
worker."' 2 The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case because
neither the pleadings nor the record supported a claim of actual intent to injure.' '
In sum, on the eve of the Delgado decision, the law regarding an employee's
ability to escape the Act's exclusivity provisions and seek common law relief was
well established and required a showing of actual intent to injure on the part of the
employer. The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Coates, however, created
an inconsistency in the actual intent test that opened the door for its potential
application to cases involving an employee's personal injuries.

104. Coates, 127 N.M. at 54, 976 P.2d at 1004.
105. 127 N.M. 571, 985 P.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1999).
106. Id. at 573-74, 985 P.2d at 175-76.
107. Id. at 574, 985 P.2d at 176.
108. Id. at 575, 985 P.2d at 177.
109. Sanford v. Presto Mfg. Co., 92 N.M. 746, 594 P.2d 1202 (Ct. App. 1979).
110. See LARSON, supra note 12, § 103.03, at 103-7 ("Even if the alleged conduct goes beyond aggravated
negligence, and includes such elements as knowingly permitting a hazardous work condition to exist.. .willfully
failing to furnish a safe work place.. .this still falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs the injury
of accidental character.").
111. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. v. Barnes, 115 N.M. 116, 847 P.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1993).
112. See Flores, 127 N.M. at 577, 985 P.2d at 179.
113.

Id.
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IV. RATIONALE
In each of the prior New Mexico cases, the plaintiffs sought to pursue tort claims
outside the bounds of the Act's exclusivity provisions. In Delgado, the New Mexico
Supreme Court found that, while the plaintiff presented the type of case previously
barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act, the policy and intent underlying the
Act, and the recent inconsistency in the actual intent test, necessitated reevaluation
of the Act's exclusivity provisions. 14 The court articulated three reasons for the
reevaluation of the actual intent test. i' 5 First, the Act declares that "the Workers'
Compensation Act... [is] not to be given broad liberal construction in favor of the
claimant or employee on the one hand, nor are the rights and interests of the
employer to be favored over those of the employee on the other hand." ' 6 The court
noted that the principle articulated in Section 52-5-1 prohibited interpretation in
favor of either party and found that in its prior application the actual intent test
favors employers.' Second, the court found that the actual intent test provides
immunity to employers in all cases except those "especially rare, practically
unprovable instances in which it is the employer's purpose to injure the
employee."" 8 The court reasoned that New Mexico should not support the policy
this standard creates.' Finally, the court, seeking to provide uniform law on the
subject, relied on its decision in Coates in which the court implicitly rejected the
actual intent test. 20
A. Workers' CompensationAct Requires Uniformity
The court noted that the policy underlying the New Mexico Workers' Compensation Act is to provide a scheme of compensation that offers benefits to both
employers and employees. 2 ' The Act represents the "result'of a bargain struck
between employers and employees. In return for the loss of a common law tort claim
for accidents arising out of the scope of the employment, [the Act] ensures that
workers are provided some compensation."'122 In 1990, the legislature amended the
Act to include Section 52-5-1, which memorializes the legislative intent by stating
the "bargain" is based on "a mutual renunciation of common law rights and defenses
by employers and employees alike."' 23 The court took notice of the potential for
abuse of this system by both employers and employees. Without the language of

114. Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148.
__,34P.3dat 1154.
115. Id. I 17-19, 131 N.M. at
116. Id. 17, 131 N.M. at __, 34 P.3d at 1154 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-1 (1991 Repl. Pamp. &

Supp. 2001)).
117.
118.

Id.
Id.

18, 131 N.M. at

, 34P.3d at 1154.

119. Id.
120. Id. 19, 131 N.M. at __, 34 P.3d at 1154 (citing Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 N.M. 47, 52-53,
976 P.2d 999, 1004-05 (1999), which held that an employer acted intentionally because it knew of the situation and
failed to prevent further injury from occurring).
34 P.3d at 1152.
121. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 12, 131 N.M. at_,

122. Id.(citing Coates, 127 N.M. at 47, 976 P.2d at 999; and Kent Nowlin Const. Co. v. Gutierrez, 99 N.M.
389, 390, 658 P.2d 1116, 1117 (1982) (describing exclusivity as striking a "balance between the worker's need for

expeditious payment and the employer's need to limit liability")).
123. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-1 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
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Section 52-1-2,124 which allows for compensation only when workers are injured by
accidents related to employment, an employee could seek recovery for a selfinduced injury, and an employer, weighing economic considerations,, could avoid
tort liability for injury intentionally inflicted on the employee." 5
With the policy of uniform application of the Act's exclusivity provisions as the
backdrop, the court began its analysis of the legislative intent of the Act in the
context of accidental and non-accidental injuries. Without legislative guidance as
to what type of employer misconduct constitutes non-accidental injury, the court
based its finding on the established common law definition of accident' 26 and
Section 52-1-11, which provides three circumstances under which an employees'
injury is non-accidental and therefore non-compensable. 27
The Act provides that an employee's injury will be non-compensable if it is due
to intoxication or if it is willfully or intentionally self-inflicted. 128 The court found
that this section in the Act evidenced the legislature's intent to bar recovery for
injuries resulting from these three forms of employee misconduct. 29 Thus, the court
found that the legislature clearly intended to extend the employers' benefit of
immunity from tort liability, like the employees' benefit of expedited compensation,
only to injuries accidentally sustained. 3 Due to the Act's lack of a provision
providing a definition of misconduct that will render the employer liable outside the
coverage of the Act, the court found that the legislature intended for the same type
of misconduct that renders an employee's injury non-compensable to also render an
employer's behavior non-accidental.''
B. Actual Intent Test Too Restrictive
Again with the Act's uniform application requirement as its backdrop, the court
reevaluated previous interpretations of the term "accident" and the application of the
actual intent test. The plaintiff argued that the Johnson Controlscourt misinterpreted
the term "accident."'' 3 2 In Johnson Controls, the court equated non-accidental
conduct with the "actual intent to injure" and determined that anything less was
accidental within the meaning of the Act.'33 In Delgado, the court agreed with the
plaintiff's argument that the actual intent test unduly restricted the plain meaning of

124. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-2 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
125. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 $13, 131 N.M. at-__, 34 P.3d at 1153.
126. Id. $14, 131 N.M. at _, 34 P.3d at 1153 (citing Cisneros v. Molycorp, Inc., 107 N.M. 788, 791, 765
P.2d 761, 764 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating "accident" means "an unlooked-for mishap or some untoward event that is
not expected or designed")).
127. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-11 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
128. Id.
129. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 14, 131 N.M. at _, 34 P.3d at 1153.
130. Id.
131. Id.$24, 131 N.M. at-, 34 P.3d at 1155.
132. Id. $9, 131 N.M. at _, 34 P.3d at 1151. See also Appellant's Brief in Chief at II (arguing that
"Johnson Controls eliminated from the Act's plain definition of "accidental injury" the foreseeable consequences
of an employer's wrongful conduct and created a virtually unprovable definition of "intentional acts" applicable
only to employers and no other similarly situated defendants--civil or criminal").
133. See Johnson.Controls World Services, Inc. v. Barnes, 115 N.M. 116, 122, 847 P.2d 761, 767 (Ct. App.
1993).
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"accident." '34 As a result, the court found that the Act requires uniform application
of the exclusivity provisions to both employers and employees, and that the actual
intent test improperly "favors employers."' 35
The court also considered past decisions in which it defined "accident" and found
that the term should be given its ordinary meaning.'36 In conjunction with its
understanding of the ordinary meaning of "accident," the court relied on Section 521-1 1, which outlines the circumstances that will render an employee's behavior nonaccidental. 3"
Absent legislative guidance, the New Mexico courts continually relied on
Professor Larson's authoritative treatise on workers' compensation law.'38 As a
result of this reliance, the court adopted the actual intent test.' The Delgado court
noted that the actual intent test was adopted without providing a critical analysis of
the legal rationale supporting its adoption. 4" In Delgado, the court analyzed
Professor Larson's argument and found that the actual intent test directly contradicted the Act's underlying policy."'
Professor Larson's definition of "accident" precludes recovery outside the Act if
the injury is caused by any employer misconduct short of conscious, deliberate
intent to inflict an injury. 4 2 The court attacked Larson's rationale for the actual
intent test 43 by relying on the Act's provision that requires an examination of the
degree of gravity of the employee's conduct to determine recovery under the Act.'44
The court found that in practice the actual intent test favors employers because
under the Act an employee's willful behavior that results in injury is sufficient to
deny the employee compensation. 45 Conversely, the actual intent test granted
employers immunity from common law suit even if their willful behavior resulted
in injury, because the injury was considered accidental for purposes of the Act. The

134.
135.
136.
untoward

Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 1 14, 131 N.M. at_,
34 P.3d at 1153.
Id. 17, 131 N.M.at __,34P.3dat1153.
Id. 14, 131 N.M. at __, 34 P.3d at 1152 (stating accident means "an unlooked-for mishap or some
event that is not expected or designed").

137. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-11 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).

138. See generally LARSON, supra note 12.
139. See Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. v. Barnes, 115 N.M. 116, 122, 847 P.2d 761, 767 (Ct. App.
1993).
140. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034
141. Id.

16, 131 N.M. at_,

34 P.3d at 1153.

142. See LARSON, supra note 12, § 103.03, at 103-7 (stating, "the common-law liability of the employer
cannot, under the almost unanimous rule, be stretched to include accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton,

wilful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of statute, or other misconduct
of the employer short of a conscious and deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting an injury").
143.

Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034

22, 131 N.M. at

-, 34 P.3d at 1155 (citing LARSON, supra note 12, §

103.03, at 103-9 ("If these decisions [applying the actual intent test] seem rather strict, one must remind oneself that
what is being tested here is not the degree of gravity or depravity of the employer's conduct, but rather the narrow
issue of the intentional versus accidental quality of the precise injury producing event. The intentional removal of
a safety device or toleration of a dangerous condition may or may not set the stage for an accidental injury later. But
in any normal use of the words, it cannot be said, if such injury does happen, that this was deliberate infliction of
harm comparable to an intentional left jab to the chin.")).
144. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-1 to -11 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
145. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 22, 131 N.M. at_, 34 P.3d at 1155.
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court determined it could not allow this imbalance to continue in light of the purpose
of the Act as stated in Section 52-5-1. 46
The court found that Professor Larson's reasoning lacked substance, and this
finding reaffirmed the court's concern about the inequality produced by the actual
intent test. 147 The court found that the actual intent
test unfairly burdens employees
48
and is therefore outside the intent of the Act.1
The court held that the Act required uniformity.'49 Therefore, withholding
compensation for an employee's willful conduct while upholding employer
immunity, unless the employer desired the consequences of its acts, was contrary to
the purpose of the Act. 5 ° The court expressly overruled the line of cases that
required the plaintiff to show an actual intent to injure. 5 The court found that the
bias the actual intent test produces "violates the explicit mandate of Section 52-5-1,
which demands equal treatment of workers and employers. In keeping with Section
52-5-1, we hereby disabuse New Mexico courts of the notion that an employer will
be deprived
of tort immunity only when the employer actually intends to injure the
52
worker."1
The court held "that the same standard of conduct that our Legislature deemed
non-accidental for purposes of depriving a worker of compensation must determine
whether an employer's misconduct renders an injury non-accidental for purposes of
exclusivity."' 5 3 The court further held that "when an employer intentionally inflicts
or willfully causes a worker to suffer an injury that would otherwise be exclusively
compensable under the Act, that employer
may not enjoy the benefits of exclusivity,
154
tort."'
in
sue
may
worker
the
and
The court recognized that in addition to the intended uniformity of the Act, and
the violation of public policy resulting from the actual intent test, its decision in
Coates created an uncertainty in the law regarding the actual intent test. 55
' Because
in Coates the court found intent based on knowledge and failure to act to prevent
harm, the court reevaluated the strict application of the actual intent test.1 56 The court
found that the use of the actual intent test as applied in Coates was the correct
application of the definition of non-accidental that the legislature intended.'57

146. Id.
147. Id. 21, 131 N.M. at-, 34 P.3d at 1155.
148.

149.
150.
151.
in Section
999.
152.
153.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. 23, 131 N.M. at-, 34 P.3d at 1155. The court expressly overruled all the cases discussed at length
III except for its decision in Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999-NMSC-013, 127 N.IvI. 47, 976 P.2d
Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 23, 131 N.M. at __, 34P.3dat 1155.
Id. 24, 131 N.M. at
, 34 P.3d at 1156.

154. Id.

155. Id. 19, 131 N.M. at __, 34 P.3d at 1154 (citing Coates, 127 N.M. at 53-54, 976 P.2d at 1005-06, in
which the court implicitly rejected the actual intent test).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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C. The Willfulness Test Established
Renouncing the sole use of the actual intent test, the court adopted a willfulness
test in order to equate both employer and employee misconduct under the
exclusivity provisions."' The court held that willfulness renders a worker's injury
non-accidental and, therefore, outside the scope of the Act when
(1) the worker or employer engages in an intentional act or omission, without
just cause or excuse, that is reasonably expected to result in the injury suffered
by the worker, (2) the worker or employer expects the intentional act or omission
to result in the injury or has utterly disregarded the consequences; and (3) the
intentional act or omission proximately causes the injury.'59
The court's willfulness test combined definitions from two previously decided
New Mexico cases to create the first and second prongs of the current test.160 The
third prong mirrors the causation requirement of the Act. 161 The court stated that the
first prong of the test represents an "objective threshold question."162 Under this
prong, the plaintiff need prove only that a reasonable person would expect the
63
employee's injury to flow from the employer's intentional act or omission.'
However, the court allowed the employer to present evidence of just cause or excuse
to negate common law liability.64
The second prong of the test requires "an examination into the subjective state of
mind of the worker or employer."'' 65 The subjectivity prong requires the fact finder
to look into the mind of the defendant at the time of the incident and determine if the
defendant sufficiently considered and recognized the potential consequences of his
or her actions. 166 If the worker or employer engaged in the act without considering
the consequences, that prong is satisfied. If the worker or employer did consider the
consequences, the second prong is satisfied only when the worker or employer
expected the injury to occur. 167 If the plaintiff cannot prove the subjective state of
mind of the employer, the plaintiff can, alternatively, prove that the act was
committed with utter disregard for the consequences.' 6 8

158.

Id.

159. Id. 26, 131 N.M. at,
34 P.3d at 1156.
160. Id. T27, 131 N.M. at_, 34 P.3d at 1156 (citing Tallman v. Arkansas Best Freight, 108 N.M. 124, 133,
767 P.2d 363, 372 (Ct. App. 1988), which stated that wilfulness "requires that the worker have knowledge of the
peril and that ability to foresee the injury for which willful misconduct is to blame"). See also Gough v. Famariss
Oil & Ref. Co., 83 N.M. 710, 714, 496 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Ct. App. 1972) (stating that willful conduct means "the
intentioned doing of a harmful act without just cause or excuse or an intentional act done in utter disregard for the
consequences").
161. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 127, 131 N.M. at-, 34 P.3d at 1156; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-11 (1991
Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
162. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 T 27, 131 N.M. at - 34 P.3d at 1156.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. 28, 131 N.M. at __, 34 P.3d at 1156.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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The third prong encompasses the requirement of Section 52-1-11 that, in order
to render a worker's injury non-compensable, willfulness must "cause"170the injury. 69
The court interpreted this causation requirement as proximate cause.
Finally, the court addressed the defendant's argument that any deviation from the
actual intent test will "visit an undue hardship upon employers in this State and
wreak havoc with New Mexico's workers' compensation system."' 17 ' In response,
the court stated, "Because we do not believe that the Act was ever intended to
immunize employers from liability for intentional torts, we fail to see the hardship
that our holding visits upon employers."'' 72 Furthermore, the court stated, "we
seriously doubt that employers are willfully injuring their employees with such
frequency that the consequence of our decision to expose such employers to tort
liability will be to 'wreak havoc' with the workers' compensation system."' 173 In
recognizing the potential implications of the opinion, the court in its final statement
said, "The greater the impact of this opinion has on the workers' compensation
system, the more profound will have been its need."' 74
V. ANALYSIS
The Delgado decision was needed to ensure uniform treatment of both employers
and employees under the Act. Delgado, however, represents a major retreat from the
previous law governing the Act's exclusivity provisions. The effect of the opinion
on employee tort actions outside the compensation system is unclear. While policy
considerations support the court's reasoning, the court's interpretation of the
legislative intent underlying the Act requires a critical analysis. In addition, the
opinion leaves unanswered several questions with regard to the applicability of the
willfulness test in future cases.
A. Do New Mexico Principlesof Statutory InterpretationSupport the Court's
Uniformity Rationale?
The court's decision in Delgado hinges on the fact that the actual intent test
created a disparity between what misconduct was sufficient for an employee to be
denied coverage under the exclusivity provisions and what misconduct was
sufficient for an employer to escape liability outside of the Act. Relying on Section
52-5-1, the court determined that the Act demands the equal treatment of workers
and employers.175 The general policy of uniform application underlying the holding
in Delgado is consistent with the court's historic construction of the statute, as well
as Section 52-5-1.

169. Id. 129, 131 N.M. at
,34 P.3d at 1156.
170. Id. See also N.M. UJI. Cv. 13-305 ("Proximate cause of an injury is that when in a natural and
continuous sequence [unbroken by intervening cause] produces the injury and without which the injury would not
have occurred. It need not be the only cause, not the last nor nearest cause. It is sufficient if it occurs with some
other cause acting at the same time, which in combination with it, causes the injury.")
171. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 30, 131N.M. at-__, 34 P.3d at 1156.
172. Id.
173. Id. 31, 131 N.M. at
174. Id.

-,34P.3dat1157.

175. Id. 23, 131 N.M. at -, 34 P.3d at 1154.
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The issue that arises as a result of the court's reasoning in Delgado is whether the
principles of statutory construction permit the court to infer legislative intent by
borrowing language from one provision and using it to construe a particular term in
a related provision. In creating the willfulness test, the court relied on Section 52-1 11, which requires that compensation be denied under the Act for an employee's
willful, intentional, or intoxicated misconduct resulting in injury. 176 In doing so, the
court found that the level of misconduct required for an employee to be denied
coverage is the
same level of misconduct that will subject the employer to common
77
law liability. 1
The New Mexico Court of Appeals recently reiterated the general rules of
statutory construction that apply to the Act. 78 The Delgado opinion follows these
four principles of statutory construction. 179 The four principles, however, do not
directly mention what principles are to be applied when the language of two related
sections differs. In Klineline v. Blackhurst,8 ° the New Mexico Supreme Court
addressed this question, stating, "Although we cannot add a requirement that is not
provided for in the statute, and cannot read into it language that is not there, we do
read the act in its entirety and construe
each part in connection with every other to
81
produce a harmonious whole."'
Under the Klineline principle, an argument could be made that the court inserted
the terms "intentional" and "willful" into Section 52-1-9 based on the requirements
laid out in Section 52-1-11. The court does not add language to the Act, however,
but uses the terms in Section 52-1-11 to assist it in determining the meaning of
"accidentally sustained," as used in Section 52-1-9 to produce a harmonious reading
of the Act.'82
In Delgado, the court was guided by Section 52-5-1. Because the actual intent test
in its application favors employers, the court's determination that uniformity
176. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-11 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001). The Delgado court, however, relying
on Section 52-1-11 to create a uniform standard of applicable misconduct, focused on only two of the three types
of employee misconduct that will render their claim self-inflicted and therefore non-compensable. The court did
not address the issue of whether an employee injured by an intoxicated employer would be permitted to escape the
bar of exclusivity. It may not be necessary to prove willful or intentional if the employer was intoxicated.
177. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 124, 131 N.M. at-, 34 P.3d at 1155.
178. Baca v. Complete Drywall Co., 2002-NMCA-002 113, 131 N.M. 413, 38 P.3d 181, 184 (2002), cert.
denied, 131 N.M. 564, 40 P.3d 1008 (2002). The court stated first "that the primary goal is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature;" second that "we examine the language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary
meanings;" third "[wihen the sections are part of a larger act, like the Workers' Compensation Act, we examine the
act in its entirety, construing each section in connection with every other section;" and fourth the sections "should
be considered together to produce a harmonious whole." Id. 13, 131 N.M. at _, 38 P.3d at 184 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
179. The court viewed the exclusivity provisions together to create a harmonious whole, uniform application
of the Act, by relying on the ordinary meaning of accident, while insuring the legislative intent memorialized in
Section 52-5-1 was its primary guide.
180. 106N.M.732,749P.2d 1111 (1988).
181. Id. at 735,749 P.2d at 1114.
182. In the event the opinion is to be understood as having inserted "willful and intentional" into the Act, the
court of appeals recently said in State v. Romero, 2000-NMCA-029 28, 128 N.M. 806, 812, 999 P.2d 1044, 1050,
that "words can be added and words in a statute can be read as though they were omitted, if that is necessary to
effect legislative intent and prevent an absurd and unreasonable meaning." As a result, the Delgado court's
reasoning is valid, even in the event it is found that the court added language to the Act. If the court did not add the
words "willful and intentional" to Section 52-1-9, the court could not give effect to the legislative intent underlying
the Act, which would cause an absurd and unreasonable result.
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requires that non-accidental be given the same meaning in both sections 52-1-11 and
52-1-9 is consistent with principles of statutory construction. When examining
sections 52-1-11 and 52-1-9 in light of Section 52-5-1, the court was required to
define non-accidental as willful and intentional to give effect to the legislative intent
underlying the Act. Due to the enactment of Section 52-5-1, the court's construction
of non-accidental as "willful" is a fair and reasonable interpretation of the Act and
does not violate the principles of statutory construction. Therefore, the Delgado
court's reasoning on this issue is sound and supported by the enactment of Section
52-5-1.
B. Does the Delgado Opinion Adopt or Reject the "Substantially Certain to
Occur" Test?
In support of the abolition of the actual intent test,'83 the plaintiff asked the court
to adopt a test of "intentional" that "would lift the bar of exclusivity when the
employer knows that its conduct is 'substantially certain' to result in the worker's
serious injury or death."'" The plaintiff's argument derived from the Restatement
(Second) of Torts Section 8, which states that "intent is used.. .to denote that the
actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes the consequences
are substantially certain to result from it."' 85 It is unclear if the court adopted or
rejected the plaintiff's argument to incorporate the alternative "substantial certainty"
test into its definition of intentional. The court held that "when an employer
intentionally or willfully causes a worker to suffer an injury, the injured worker may
sue in tort.' ' 186 Therefore, any conduct that is intentional or willful, under the test
articulated in Delgado, is non-accidental and falls outside the coverage of the Act.
While the focus of the opinion is on the willfulness test, it is important to briefly
revisit what is meant by the word "intentional" after Delgado. The opinion makes
clear that the court abolished the "actual intent" test as the sole test. A showing of
intentional misconduct (actual intent) on the part of the employer still will permit
an employee to file a common law action.
Although the Delgado opinion does not discuss or adopt the alternative
"substantial certainty" test articulated by the plaintiff, it may be logical to infer
that
the "substantially certain to occur/result" test the plaintiff was seeking has been
incorporated into the Delgado holding, based on the Restatement's definition of
intent.187 As a result, the court in its holding may have adopted the meaning of intent
as used elsewhere in the law of torts. If so, then the substantial certainty test the
plaintiff was seeking was likely incorporated into the understanding of intentional
act and may be a valid argument in the future. In addition, the focus of the
Restatement's definition of intent is not on the act itself, but on the consequences of
the act. 188 Focusing on the consequences of the intentional act or omission is
consistent with the court's requirements under the willfulness test, which requires
183. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-0341 9, 131 N.M. at, 34 P.3d at 1152.
184. Id.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
186. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 24, 131 N.M. at-, 34 P.3d at 1155.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
188. Id. at cmt.a.
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both an objective and subjective analysis of the consequences resulting from the
employer's act or omission."'89

Because "substantial certainty" requires more proof than the willfulness test,"'
but less than the actual intent test, it is possible that the court impliedly incorporated
it as sufficient to overcome the Act's exclusivity provisions. Therefore, if an
employee is seeking to sue his or her employer outside the scope of the Act, it may
be advisable to plead all three levels of employer misconduct: actual intent to harm,
substantially certain to occur/result, and willfulness.
C. Willfulness Test Analyzed
The court's three-prong willfulness test19' left several questions unanswered with
regard to the future applicability of the test. The court introduced the willfulness test
by stating that it combined two previous methods for defining willfulness for
purposes of the Act. 192 As a result, the Delgado willfulness test contains both an
objective and a subjective test.
Under the first prong, the employer's behavior will be considered willful when
"the worker or employer engages in an intentional act or omission, without just
cause or excuse, that is reasonably expected to result in the injury suffered by the
worker."' 93 The objective nature of this requirement poses no problem. The question
left open, however, is what constitutes "just cause or excuse."
The court noted that for people who hold certain jobs, such as firefighters and
police officers, the first prong might otherwise be met, but that the conduct at issue
would not meet the prong's requirement because a just cause or excuse may exist.'94
By recognizing that in certain employment positions, under some circumstances, an
employee may be directed to engage in an act that is expected to result in injury, the
court acknowledges that emergency situations that involve the saving of lives or
property may constitute just cause or excuse.195
The opinion does not make clear if economic justifications for an employer's
conduct will ever constitute just cause or excuse. One of the reasons underlying the
court's abolition of the actual intent test, however, was that "it encourages

189. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 26-28, 131 N.M. at __, 34 P.3d at 1156.
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b, illus. 1. (1965) ("Intent is not, however, limited to
consequences which are desired. If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to

result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result. As
the probability that the consequences will follow decreases, and becomes less than substantial certainty, the actor's
conduct loses the character of intent, and becomes mere recklessness.... [A]s the probability decreases further, and
amounts only to a risk that the result will follow, it becomes ordinary negligence."). Illustration I provides the
following example of substantial certainty: "A throws a bomb into B's office for the purpose of killing B. A knows
that C, B's stenographer, is in the office. A has no desire to injure C, but knows that his act is substantially certain
to do so. C is injured by the explosion. A is subject to liability to C for an intentional tort." Id.

191. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034

26, 131 N.M. at-, 34 P.3d at 1156.

192. Id. (quoting Tallman v. Arkansas Best Freight, 108 N.M. 124, 133, 767 P.2d 363, 372 (Ct. App. 1988)
(stating willfulness "requires that the worker have knowledge of the peril and the ability to foresee the injury for
which willful misconduct is to blame"); also citing Gough v. Famariss Oil & Ref. Co., 83 N.M. 710, 714,496 P.2d
1106, 1110 (Ct. App. 1972) (stating willful misconduct means "the intentioned doing of a harmful act without just
cause or excuse or an intentional act done in utter disregard for the consequences")).
193. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 26, 131 N.M. at_, 34 P.3d at 1156.
,34P.3dat 1156.
194. Id. 27, 131 N.M. at
195. Id.

Summer 2002]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

employers, motivated by economic gain, to knowingly subject a worker to injury in
the name of profit making."' 96 The court strongly disapproved of the cost-benefit
policy the actual intent test promoted. As a result, economic considerations will
most likely not constitute just cause or excuse. The New Mexico courts will have
to carve out a definition of "just cause or excuse" when construing this prong.
Under the second prong, the employer's behavior will be considered willful when
"the worker or employer expects the intentional act or omission to result in the
injury or has utterly disregarded the consequences." 1 97 The subjective element of this
prong requires the fact finder to examine the state of mind of the employer.198
There are several questions left unanswered by the second prong. The first is the
meaning of the term "expects." The second is whether the particularized injury
needs to be considered in the consequences or if it is enough to consider that an
injury may result from the employer's conduct. The final question left unanswered
is the meaning of "utter disregard."
The first element requires that "the worker or employer "expects" the intentional
act or omission to result in the injury suffered.' ' 99 Webster's Dictionary defines
"expect" as "to look for (mentally), to look forward to, as to something
that is
believed to be about to happen or come." 2" This definition indicates an anticipatory
response more than a subjective understanding of the possible consequences of an
act or omission that the prong requires.
A more helpful definition is found in Merriam-Webster'sCollegiateDictionary,
which defines "expects" as to "consider probable or certain."' ' This definition
appears to be more in line with the policies articulated by the court. By virtue of the
term "probable" provided in the above definition, "expects" may mean more likely
than not, as used in the preponderance of the evidence standard for civil actions. 2
Due to the general inexplicit nature of the term "expects," this too will be a question
the New Mexico courts must resolve in the future application of the Delgado test.
The second question left unanswered by this prong is how the fact finder will
determine the employer's subjective state of mind. The prong requires the fact finder
to examine the state of mind of the employer and determine if the employer
considered the consequences of the act or omission." 3 The court stated that, if "the
worker or employer did consider the consequences of the act or omission, this prong
would be satisfied only when the worker or employer expected the injury to
occur. ' '2 4 The court clarified what behavior would not satisfy the requirement,
stating, "It will not be enough, for example, to prove that the worker or employer
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. 18, 131 N.M. at
,34 P.3d at 1154.
Id. 26, 131 N.M. at -,34 P.3d at 1156.
Id.
Id.

200. WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 799 (3d ed. 1981).

201. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 407 (10th ed. 2001).
202. N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 13-304; Campbell v. Campbell, 62 N.M. 330, 341, 310 P.2d 266, 273 (1957) (stating
that "preponderance of the evidence" simply means the greater weight of the evidence); Lumpkins v. McPhee, 59
N.M. 442, 453, 286 P.2d 299, 306 (1955) ("A party is said to have established his case by a preponderance of the
evidence when the evidence tips the scales in favor of the party on whom rests the burden of proof, even though
it barely tips them.").
203. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 28, 131 N.M. at-__, 34 P.3d at 1156.
204. Id.
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considered the consequences and negligently failed to expect the worker's injury to
be among them."2 5
The court did not make clear if the specific injury need be considered by the
employer, or if it is sufficient that the employer considered the consequences of its
6
conduct and that an injury was among the possible consequences.20 The answer to
this question is unclear. In determining proximate cause and the foreseeability of
injury, however, New Mexico is an "an" injury state.20 7 If the plaintiff is foreseeable
and within the zone of danger, the specific injury that ensues as a result of negligent
or intentional misconduct need not be foreseeable. 20 8 The New Mexico courts must
determine whether this law will apply to Delgado issues.2 °9
The final question the subjectivity prong raises is what is the meaning of "utter
disregard" in the context of the willfulness test. The court did not define what would
constitute "utter disregard" but did state that a lack of consideration of the
210
consequences of an act or omission would satisfy the requirements of this prong.
As to whether willful behavior encompasses intentional acts without regard for
the consequences, or "utter disregard," the court of appeals spoke in Rivero v. The
Lovington Country Club.21 ' In Rivero, the court found that "willful" or "malicious,"
for purposes of determining a landowner's conduct resulting in injury, encompassed
intentional acts performed without regard for the consequences.2 2 The court found
that its definition, including utter disregard, was consistent with the definition of

205. Id.
206. If a defendant admits to directing a plaintiff to undertake an activity likely to result in an injury but
weighed the consequences and foresaw only that injury x and injury y would occur and failed to consider that injury
z could occur, is that enough to fail the test and keep exclusivity intact?
207. See Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 61, 792 P.2d 36, 38 (1990); see also Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N'E. 99 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928).
208. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 61,792 P.2d at 38. In addition, N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 13-1827, punitive damages, defines
willful conduct as "the intentional doing of an act with knowledge that harm may result." The U.J.I. definition
denotes that the subjective thoughts of the actor are considered, but the exact consequences of the intentional act
need not necessarily be foreseeable. The subjective test articulated by the court, however, appears to require the
actor to consider the consequences of his/her act in the context of the foreseeability of the injury sustained.
209. Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000). Turner addressed the subjective versus objective tests,
and determined that when evaluating whether an employer's act or omission was "substantially certain to occur,"
the courts should apply an objective standard. Id. at 689. The court found that "[t]o hold otherwise would encourage
a practice of willful blindness on the part of employers who could ignore conditions that under an objective test
would be found to be dangerous, and later claim lack of subjective knowledge or intent to harm an employee." Id.
at 691. The Turner court reasoned that the subjective test provided too much protection to employers and, thus, had
the effect of returning to the actual intent test it had previously abolished. Id. at 688. Delgado is distinguishable from
Turner on both factual and legal grounds because the Delgado court provided the "utter disregard" portion of the
test in conjunction with the subjective portion of the test. Delgado, 2001 -NMSC-034 26, 131 N.M. at __, 34 P.3d
at 1156. The question that follows is, can the plaintiff allege the employer's subjective knowledge that the injury
would result, and in the alternative allege the employer acted with utter disregard?
210. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 27, 131 N.M. at __,34 P.3d at 1156. A possible answer can be found in
NEW MEXICO UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTION 13-1827. It does not define "utter disregard," but the term "utter
indifference" is used in the definition of wanton conduct. N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 13-1827. It does define wanton conduct
as "the doing of an act with utter indifference to or conscious disregard for a person's" rights or safety. Id. The
definition of utter indifference, as a conscious disregard for a person's rights or safety, appears to mirror the court's
language in Delgado, in which the subjective prong is met if the employer never considers the consequences of his
acts or omissions that result in injury.
211. 124 N.M. 273, 949 P.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1997).
212. Id. at 275, 949 P.2d at 289.
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willful provided in Black's Law Dictionary,which defined willful to include "acts
done with indifference to the natural consequences. 2 3
If utter disregard means "acts done with indifference or conscious disregard for
the consequences" in that context, then it most likely carries the same meaning in
the context of the Delgado test. As a result, if the plaintiff can prove that the
employer acted with conscious disregard, meaning the employer did not consider the
consequences of his conduct, then this prong is satisfied. However, it is not clear
what type of evidence, without questioning the employer as to his or her thoughts,
will be sufficient to prove utter disregard. Would lack of just cause or excuse be
sufficient to infer or prove utter disregard? The court's placement of the word "or"
after the first requirement suggests that the plaintiff need not prove both subjective
expectation of injury and utter disregard for the consequences. However, pleading
both elements of the subjective test in the alternative may be advisable.
The requirement of the third prong is causation, which the court has defined as
proximate cause.23 4 The court found the causation requirement to be proximate cause
based on the interpretation of that section by the court of appeals. 2 5 The Act does
not define proximate cause. As a result, traditional tort principles and definitions
will apply.2 6
In sum, the court's interpretation of the Act's uniformity requirement is valid
under the rules of statutory construction. In addition, it is possible the court adopted
by incorporation the "substantial certainty" test the plaintiff sought. Furthermore,
several aspects of the application of the test remain unresolved. All of these issues
necessitate resolution by New Mexico courts in the future application of the
Delgado test.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
A. PracticalConsiderationsof the Delgado Opinion
The Delgado opinion left unanswered several questions regarding the procedural
ramifications of the opinion, including the election of remedies and the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. Furthermore, the practical effects of the newly created law on the

213. Id. at 276, 949 P.2d at 290 (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1599 (6th ed. 1990)).
214. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 29, 131 N.M. at-, 34P.3dat 1156.
215. Id. (relying on N.M. STAT. ANN § 52-1-11 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001); and citing Mitchum v.
Triple S Trucking, 113 N.M. 85, 89, 823 P.2d 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1991) (stating that scrutiny of Section 52-1-11
indicates that the New Mexico Legislature, in enacting legislation establishing the affirmative defense of
intoxication, followed the approach taken by a majority of states requiring proof that the worker's intoxication
constituted a proximate cause of his or her injury)).
216. N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 13-305 (" A proximate cause of an injury is that which in a natural and continuous
sequence [unbroken by intervening cause] produces the injury and without which the injury would not have
occurred. It need not be the only cause, not the last nor nearest cause. It is sufficient if it occurs with some other
cause acting at the same time, which in combination with it, causes the injury."). See also N.M. U.J.I. CIv. 13-306
(defining independent intervening cause); Torres v. El Paso Electric Co., 127 N.M. 729, 739, 987 P.2d 386, 396
(1999) (stating that independent intervening cause is an affirmative defense to a claim of intentional tort). In
addition, proximate cause is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. See Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M.
59, 61, 792 P.2d 36, 38 (1990). Therefore, the judge on a motion for summary judgment can only determine the
sufficiency of the evidence and not whether proximate cause exists. See generallyBartlett v. Mirabal, 128 N.M. 830,
999 P.2d 1062 (Ct. App. 2000).
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insurance industry remain unclear. In addition, Delgado, by addressing the lack of
legislative guidance as to what constitutes a non-accidental injury, 2 7 spurred a
legislative response in the 2002 session that may lead to further legislative action in
2003.
B. ProceduralImplications of Delgado
As a result of the Delgado decision, an injured worker may encounter two
possible issues. The first is the potential effect of the decision on an employee's
ability to file alternatively a compensation claim and a common law action. Must the
employee elect to recover under the Act, or can the employee file for recovery under
the Act as well as concurrently file an intentional tort action in district court? The
second question pertains to the role of the doctrine of collateral estoppel with regard
to a district court's determination of the injury as "accidental" and, therefore, within
the coverage of the Act.
Eldridge v. Circle K Corp.2 8 answers the question of whether an employee may
file both compensation and common law actions. In Eldridge, the decedent's
employer filed a compensation action pursuant to Section 52-5-5(A)2 19 requesting
benefits be paid under the Act to the decedent's estate. The decedent's estate
objected to the filing of the claim, because it was seeking common law relief
alleging the decedent's death was the result of the employer's intentional misconduct.22 The workers' compensation judge determined the estate failed to establish
that the employer committed an intentional wrong; therefore, the Act was the
exclusive remedy for the estate.22'
The issue addressed in Eldridge was whether the workers' compensation judge
or the district court has primary jurisdiction to determine whether an injury is
intentional.222 At issue was whether the decedent's death was accidental or caused
by the intentional misconduct of his employer. 223 The court held that when an
employee asserts a cause of action based in common law for a non-accidental injury
caused by the employer, the district court "should make the initial determination of
jurisdiction. 224 The workers' compensation judge is required to defer to the district
court.225 The court found that, upon the claimant's request, the workers' compensation judge should defer or suspend action until a court resolves the issue of the
nature of the tort claim. 226 If the claimant's tort action fails, then the workers'
compensation proceeding may continue. 7

1, 14, 131 N.M. at _, 34 P.3d at 1151-54.
217. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034
218. 123 N.M. 145,934 P.2d 1074 (Ct. App. 1997).
219. id. at 146-47, 934 P.2d at 1075-76 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-5(A) (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp.
1996) (stating that when a dispute arises under the Workers' Compensation Act "any party may file a claim with
the director" no sooner than thirty-one days from the date of injury") (emphasis added).
220. Eldridge, 123 N.M. at 147, 934 P.2d at 1076.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 151, 934 P.2d at 1080.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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As a result, an employee seeking to file a common law action against his
or her
employer under Delgado does not lose the right to alternatively seek recovery
under
the Act if the court determines the employer's conduct was accidental.228
Therefore,
when an employee asserts a claim of intentional or willful misconduct
on the part
of the employer, the employee should follow the filing provisions of
the Act,229
provide the workers' compensation judge with information on the common
law
cause of action, request a suspension of the proceedings under the Act,
and file the
complaint with the court. If the employee follows the procedure provided
by the
court in Eldridge, and has a cause of action against the employer for intentional
or
willful infliction of the injury, the workers' compensation judge must
defer to the
district court's determination of the issue. Upon final resolution by the district
court,
the employee will either dismiss the compensation action or return to
the workers'
compensation judge for determination of remedies under the Act.
The second question that arises under both Delgado and Eldridgepertains
effect of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 2" The district courts have to the
primary
jurisdiction to apply Delgado in cases in which the employee alleges intentional
or
willful misconduct by an employer.21 As a result, the court can find that
the alleged
act was accidental and, therefore, subject to the Act's exclusivity provisions.
The issue that arises is whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel requires
the
workers' compensation judge to apply the district court's determination
of the injury
as accidental. Can the employer at a workers' compensation proceeding
assert he or
she acted intentionally, thereby denying the employee recovery under
the Act?
Alternatively, could an employee use the determination of "accidental
injury" to
prohibit the employer from asserting its affirmative defenses under the
Act?
Collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of ultimate facts or issues that are
actually
litigated and necessarily decided in a prior action.232 With regard to an
employer's
ability to assert the defense of intentional misconduct under the Act, the
claim would
be collaterally estopped as a result of the trial court's determination of the
injury as
accidental. 3 The issue of whether the employer's conduct was intentional
or
accidental would have been actually litigated and necessarily decided
in order for
the court to rule. The doctrine of collateral estoppel would prevent an employer
from
relitigating the matter before the court or the workers' compensation judge.
Conversely, the employer will be able to raise the defense that an employee
was
injured by intoxication, intentional misconduct, or willfulness. These issues
will not
have been actually litigated or necessarily determined in the trial court
when the
district court rules that the injury was accidental, and thus the sole
remedy is
228. See id.
229. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-5-5 to -9; §§ 52-1-29 to -31 (1991 Repl.
Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
230. The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of ultimate
facts or issues that are actually
litigated and necessarily decided in a prior action. See Silva v. State, 106
N.M. 472,474, 745 P.2d 380, 381 (1987);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980)
(Under collateral estoppel, "[wihen an issue of fact or law is
actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the
determination is essential to the judgment,
the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,
whether on the same or a different
claim.").
231. Eldridge, 123 N.M. at 151, 934 P.2d at 1080.
232. See Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 474, 745 P.2d 380, 381 (1987);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980).
233. See Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987).
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workers' compensation. 234 Because the Act provides the employer with affirmative
defenses, the issues decided by the workers' compensation judge are distinctly
different from those necessarily decided by the trial court. Therefore, the employer
is not denied its affirmative defenses under the Act, because the district court would
not have actually litigated or necessarily decided an employer's affirmative defense
issues.
C. GeneralLiability Insurance versus Workers' Compensation Coverage
The Act mandates that all employers in New Mexico who meet the requirements
of Section 52-1-2 carry workers' compensation insurance coverage. 235 In addition
to workers' compensation insurance, most employers carry a form of general
liability insurance to cover negligence-based civil liability claims brought by
employees or third parties." 6
Generally, businesses carry commercial general liability insurance, which
provides coverage for liability incurred as a result of unintentional and unexpected
personal injury or property damage. 237 A commercial general liability insurance
policy does not insure against all claims.238 Most commercial general liability
insurance policies provide coverage for an "occurrence, ' 239 which is defined in part
as "an accident. '24 As a general rule, commercial general liability
insurance policies
241
exclude coverage for an insured's intentional misconduct.
Most insurance policies exclude coverage for intentional misconduct because
coverage for intentional torts violates public policy. 242 As a result, an employer most
likely cannot contract for insurance to cover damage judgments when intentional
misconduct is alleged and proved. The Supreme Court of New Mexico has held,
however, that insurance contracts can provide coverage for punitive damages.243
Punishment is the goal of punitive damages. If an individual can purchase a policy
to cover damages for punishment, it may be possible for an employer to purchase
additional insurance to cover willful misconduct.

234. See id.
235. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-2 (1991 Repl. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
236. Joseph P. Monteleone, Coverage Issues Under Commercial General Liability and Directors' and
Officers' Liability Policies. 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 47, 49 (1996).
237. Sam P. Rynearson, Exclusion of Expected or Intended PersonalInjury or PropertyDamage under the
Occurrence Definition of the Standard Comprehensive General Liability Policy, THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL
LIABILITY POLICY: A CRITIQUE OF SELECTED PROVISIONS 3-21 (Arthur J. Liederman ed. 1985).

238. Francis J. Mootz, Principles of InsuranceCoverage: A Guide for the Employment Lawyer, 18 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 5, 17 (1996).
239. See Rynearson, supra note 237, at 3 (stating The National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the
Mutual Insurance Rating bureau defines "occurrence" as "an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions,
which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured").
240. Id.
241. See Mootz, supra note 238, at 14.
242. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, Inc. v. McKenna, 90 N.M. 516, 519, 565 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1977); see also
Martin Paskind, Review of Firm'sLiability Coverage Is Vital, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 3, 2001, at Business Outlook
5; MARK S. RHODES, THE LAW OF COMMERCIAL INSURANCE 2 (Standard Publishing).

243. Baker v. Armstrong, 106 N.M. 395, 398, 744 P.2d 170, 173 (1987)..
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In Wolff v. General Casualty Co. of America,24 the court held that there is no
public policy in New Mexico that requires denial of coverage for "willful acts." 24
In Wolff, the court declined to extend the general policy prohibiting insurance
coverage for intentional torts to unexpected injuries. 2 6 As a result, it is possible that
an employer may now purchase coverage for its willful acts under Delgado but be
precluded from purchasing coverage for its intentional torts. This result is so
because other cases provide that coverage for intentional misconduct violates public
policy and may not be purchased at any price.247
Before and after Delgado, insurance coverage may be available for punitive
damages, 248 and for willful misconduct,2 9 but not for intentional torts. As a result,
it would be advisable for an employee to request a special verdict form, 250 requesting
the fact finder to determine if the misconduct was intentional, willful, or both. If the
fact finder concludes that the employer's misconduct was intentional, the damage
award will most likely be paid out of the pocket of the employer. If the fact finder
determines that the employer is guilty of willful misconduct, and coverage for such
acts is permitted and was purchased, then the employer's insurance company will
most likely pay the damages. It is unclear what the result will be, however, if the
fact finder determines both intentional and willful misconduct, when a policy
covering willful misconduct exists. The employee may need to consider these issues
if he or she anticipates that the recovery of damages may be difficult or if the
employer may be judgment-proof.
The expense of paying premiums for extended general liability insurance for
willful misconduct is an effect the Delgado decision could impose on New Mexico
employers. As Justice Franchini stated in the opinion, however,
[W]e seriously doubt that employers are willfully injuring their workers with
such frequency that the consequence of our decision to expose such employers
to tort liability will be to wreak havoc with the.. .system. If New Mexico
employers are intentionally or willfully injuring their employees at such a
frequency that coverage for such acts will amount to undue economic hardship,
then the need for the opinion was great.2
It would be advisable for employers who fear potential exposure as a result of the
Delgado willfulness test to meet with their general liability carrier to discuss the
possibilities available for polices that provide coverage for willful misconduct.

244. 68 N.M. 292, 361 P.2d 330(1961).
245. Id. at 298, 361 P.2d at 335.
246. Baker, 106 N.M. at 397, 744 P.2d at 172 (commenting on the holding in Wolff).
247. See generally Sena v. Travelers Insurance Co., 801 F. Supp 471 (D.N.M. 1992); Knowles v. United
Services Automobile Assoc., 113 N.M. 703, 832 P.2d 394 (1992); Safeco Insurance Co. v. McKenna, 90 N.M. 516,
565 P.2d 1033 (1977).
248. Baker, 106 N.M. at 397, 744 P.2d at 172.
249. Wolff, 68 N.M. at 298, 361 P.2d at 335.
250. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-049.
251. Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 1 31, 34 131 N.M. at-., 34 P.3d 1156-57.
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D. Legislative Response to the Delgado Opinion
During the 2002 session of the New Mexico Legislature, which followed the
Delgado decision by only three months, the Senate proposed and passed a joint
memorial252 "requesting the New Mexico Legislative Council to refer to the
appropriate interim committee a study of the Workers' Compensation Laws and
Practices, 25 3 which had not been the subject of oversight or study for more than
seven years. 254 The joint memorial mandated that if such committee be formed, it
examine the Act, the New Mexico Constitution, and court decisions governing
workers' compensation laws in New Mexico.255 After passage in the Senate, thejoint
memorial was tabled in the House of Representatives on February 14, 2002, 2 6 the
last day of the 2002 regular session.
The proposed joint memorial may have been enacted in response to the Delgado
court's abolition of the actual intent test as the sole test to raise the bar of exclusivity. It is likely that the Act will be at the center of debate in the 2003 legislative
session. The legislature will consider whether to eliminate all but the actual intent
test, expand actual intent by including "substantially certain to occur/result" into the
definition of intentional, or expressly incorporate into the Act the intentional/
willfulness test established in Delgado.
If the legislature reinstates the actual intent test as applied prior to Delgado,257 a
constitutional challenge on the grounds of violation of equal protection, due process,
and right .to trial by jury will likely follow. In addition, promoting a policy of
employer protectionism at the expense of New Mexico employees and their families
may not be popular with the citizens of New Mexico.258
VII. CONCLUSION
In Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., the New Mexico Supreme Court
overruled the cases in which the actual intent test was the sole test used to raise the
Act's bar of exclusivity. The court rejected the conclusion that actual intent was the
intended meaning of non-accidental in the New Mexico Workers' Compensation
Act. As a result, an employer has greater exposure to common law actions resulting

252. S.J. MEM. 24, 45th Leg. (N.M. 2002).

253. Id.
254. Id.

255. Id.
256. NEW MEXICO STATE LEGISLATURE BILL FINDER, at http://legis.state.nm.us/sessionO2.asp?chamber

=S&type=JM&number=24 (Feb. 5, 2002).
257. See Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. v. Barnes, 115 N.M. 116, 847 P.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1993).
258. The argument in favor of incorporating the Delgado test into the Act is that a policy of employer
protectionism is not a policy the legislature or the citizens of New Mexico should accept or promote. Conversely,
the argument in support of legislatively reinstating the actual intent test is one based in the theory of economic
development in New Mexico. An argument surely will be made that if New Mexico permits its employees to sue
outside the Act, either businesses in the state will go bankrupt or New Mexico will fail to attract new businesses.
In response to such an argument, it should be noted that New Mexico, while in the minority, is not the first state to
abolish the use of the actual intent test. Eight states, including Florida, New Jersey, North Carolina, Texas, and
Louisiana, have all adopted the substantially certain to occur test, which their state legislatures subsequently
memorialized in each respective act. In addition, four states, West Virginia, California, Michigan, and Washington,
adopted either the substantial certainty test or a willfulness test. The legislative reaction in these states has been
mixed. See LARSON, supra note 12, § 103.04(D), at D103-32 to -40.
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from the willful infliction of injury on an employee. Additionally, the adoption of
the willfulness test ensures the Act's intended uniform application to both employers
and employees, which supports the policies underlying the adoption of the Act.

